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The period between 1990 and 1997 saw a record growth
in the number of public–private partnerships (PPPs) for
provision of water/sewerage services in developing
countries. Nonetheless, PPPs have not fared well in
sub-Saharan Africa, which accounted for 80% of the PPP
contracts that attracted disputes or were cancelled
between 1990 and 2004. Since the 1980s, management
contracts between international water operators and
utilities in Africa have been promoted by the World
Bank and other multi-international agencies as a model
that could boost management capacity in utilities of
developing countries and lead to improved effectiveness
and efficiency. The present study draws upon empirical
data from Kampala, Uganda and uses it as a case study
to show that, on the whole, these expectations were not
fulfilled. It is demonstrated that the performance
improvements of the National Water and Sewerage
Corporation, the utility in Kampala, were not as high as
expected when it was twice managed by different
international operators. On the other hand, the
corporation has made impressive performance
improvements under the current public management
model. Conclusions have been drawn from the case
study on what are the drivers of performance
improvement in the water utilities of developing
countries.
1. INTRODUCTION
The UN millennium development goals agreed upon by the
world leaders at the turn of the century have become a global
framework for benchmarking development in low-income
countries. Target 10 of the goals is to halve, by 2015, the
proportion of people without sustainable access to drinking
water and basic sanitation.1 Achieving this and similar targets
is a big challenge in the urban areas of developing countries,
which will absorb 95% of the 2.02 billion projected increase in
the world’s urban population during the period 2000–2030.2
Most of this population growth is being absorbed by slums.
For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 62% of the urban
dwellers in 2005 lived in slum conditions, which is defined as
lack of at least one of the basic conditions of decent housing,
namely adequate sanitation, improved water supply, durable
housing or adequate living space.2
State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which had been providing
services in developing countries since independence, were
plagued by inefficiencies and failed to expand service to meet
the rapidly growing demand.3 Hence, international donor
agencies, on which many developing countries have relied for
infrastructure development since the debt crisis of the 1980s,
initially demanded the restructuring of SOEs, and thereafter
called for public–private partnerships (PPPs) in the delivery of
services.4 PPPs may be defined as partnerships in which public
sector bodies enter into contractual agreements with the private
sector entities to construct and/or manage public sector
infrastructure facilities, such as energy, water/sanitation
services, telecommunications and social services (hospitals,
prisons, schools, etc.).5 It was expected that the PPPs would not
only attract the much needed infrastructure investments to the
developing countries but would also provide a new emphasis on
a proactive, performance- and commerce-oriented
management.6
Reforms were carried out in earnest by the developing countries,
and, since the late 1980s, international water operators have
signed management, lease or concession contracts with water
utilities in many developing countries. For instance, by 2005, 17
countries in SSA had invited international water operators to
provide water services to their urban areas.7 Nonetheless, the
number of people with inadequate service levels for both water
and sanitation has been increasing. The World Health
Organisation/UN International Children’s Emergency Fund
(WHO/Unicef) estimated that the number of urban residents in
the developing regions without access to safe water increased
from 107million in 1990 to 170million in 2004, while for
sanitation, the number increased from 475million to 611million
in the same period.8 The situation is critical in SSA where it was
estimated in 2004 that only 56 and 34% of the population had
access to an improved water source and basic sanitation,
respectively.9 This paper traces the introduction of PPPs in SSA,
provides general trends of PPPs in the subcontinent and finally
analyses the performance of the management contracts for
provision of services to Kampala, Uganda.
2. THE GENESIS OF PPPS IN UTILITY SERVICES IN
AFRICA
Urban water services infrastructure in most African countries
has been state-owned since independence, although their
management has changed hands. Following the footsteps of the
colonial administrations, post-independence governments in
Africa created SOEs to manage urban water and sewerage
services, while government departments directly managed rural
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water and sanitation. Many of the African leaders were highly
influenced by socialist/communist concepts during the struggle
for independence, and considered government intervention in
the economy a natural order of affairs.4 However, many SOEs
failed to meet the expectations of their customers, governments
and international funding agencies: they could neither expand
the infrastructure adequately to serve the increasing urban
population, nor could they efficiently operate/maintain existing
infrastructure to provide good service levels to the existing
customer base.3
The poor performance of SOEs could primarily be attributed to
the multiple and conflicting objectives the managers were
required to achieve. For instance, SOEs were expected to operate
in a commercial, efficient and profitable manner, but also be
able to provide services at below-cost prices. They were also
expected to generate employment for the citizens, deal with
state-sanctioned suppliers, and expand services to politically-
determined locations, all of which contradicted the first
objective. Other reasons for poor performance have been cited,
such as
(a) poor initial investment decisions
(b) inadequate initial and working capital
(c) poor collection efficiencies, mainly brought about by non-
paying state agencies
(d ) inadequate financial reporting and monitoring systems
(e) a disabling institutional framework
( f ) poor human resources capacity at managerial and technical
levels.3,4
By the late 1970s, the financial performance of most urban
water utilities (managed by SOEs) in SSA had deteriorated to the
extent that direct budget transfers and indirect subsidies such as
non-collection of taxes and social security payments could not
redeem the SOEs. By the early 1980s, the financing gap became
so critical that it attracted corrective action from the
international financial institutions, mainly the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank estimated
that by the early 1990s, the annual losses from inefficiencies
and unsustainable pricing policies were estimated to be nearly
equal to annual investment in infrastructure.3 As a solution, the
international financial institutions provided structural
adjustment lending loans, which in addition to supporting
‘hardware’ infrastructure projects also required the borrower to
take measures to correct unstable imbalances in the economy,
which could have been brought about by external shocks such
as rapid energy price increases or the collapse of export
markets. These structural adjustment loans were usually rapidly
disbursed and were often accompanied by longer-term technical
assistance. Africa accounted for about 70% of the SOE-related
structure adjustment projects carried out by the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund in the period 1981 to 1990.4
Prior to the disbursement, the borrowing governments had to
agree to carry out a wide range of restructuring and
performance improvement measures not involving ownership
change, and the preparation for PPPs. The required reforms
included
(a) classification of SOEs
(b) elimination of state monopolies
(c) legal and legislative reforms to make SOEs more autonomous
(d ) changes towards cost-based pricing
(e) human resources development including reassessment of staff
levels, retraining and redeployments
( f ) strengthening of financial management systems.
Whereas some commercial and manufacturing SOEs were
subjected to the conditionality of privatisation, similar
conditions did not apply to infrastructure utilities.4
The level at which these conditions were fulfilled varied from
one country to another, and therefore had varying effects on
service provision. First, tariffs were increased – although these
changes did not necessarily result in a substantial financial
impact, as major consumers, particularly government
departments, did not pay their bills. Second, governments were
relieved of budgetary burdens, although they continued to
provide SOEs with guarantees for short-term loans from
national banks to cover working capital. Third, there were staff
lay-offs, which prompted staff to build up organised opposition
and raise the political temperature against the interference of
international financial institutions in the economies of the
developing countries. However, in many instances, the
respective governments did not honour their commitments such
as match-funding the rehabilitation of the infrastructure, and
did not follow through with some of the drastic and sometimes
socially painful restructuring measures. For instance,
performance contracts and other devices set up to minimise the
interference of government bureaucrats in management of SOEs
did not achieve the objectives, and set performance targets were
rarely enforced or met.3,10 As a result, performance
improvement, such as the one attained by Sierra Leone’s Guma
Valley Water Company, was more the exception than the rule.4
In addition to the dismal performance of water utilities, there
were other key factors that compelled governments in
developing countries to consider PPPs. During the 1980s, most
economies of SSA experienced large fiscal deficits, and
infrastructure services became an easy target for budget cuts.
PPPs in infrastructure were sought to reduce the over-
dependence of SOE on the government coffers.3,10 Adoption of
PPPs was also buttressed by radical economic theory that
originated from the USA in the 1960s, which had inspired the
American deregulation and British divestiture programmes.10
These ideas, coupled with the disappointments from SOE reform
and rehabilitation measures in developing countries, sparked an
international debate on the adoption of PPPs for infrastructure
services. However, unlike policy makers in some developing
countries (such as Latin America), governments from SSA did
not take up PPPs in infrastructure out of their own choice: most
SSA leaders embraced PPPs as a major conditionality for
accessing international donor funds.4
3. TRENDS AND SCOPE OF WATER SERVICES PPPS
IN SSA
Public–private partnerships for infrastructure services can take
many forms and may incorporate some or all of the following
features5
(a) public infrastructure facilities are transferred to a private
sector entity (with or without payment in return)
(b) the private sector entity builds, extends or renovates a facility
(c) the public sector entity specifies the operating features of the
facility
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(d ) services are provided by the private sector using a public
sector facility for a defined period of time (usually with
restrictions on operations and pricing)
(e) the private sector entity agrees to transfer the facility back to
the public sector (with or without payment) at the end of the
agreement.
The private participation in the infrastructure project databank
maintained by the World Bank classifies the projects using the
following definitions.11
(a) Operations and management contract: a private entity takes
over the management of a state-owned enterprise for a given
period. This category includes management contracts and
leases.
(b) Operations and management contract with major capital
expenditure: a private entity takes over the management of a
state-owned enterprise for a given period during which it also
assumes significant investment risk. This category includes
concession-type contracts such as build–transfer–operate,
build–lease–operate, and build–rehabilitate–operate–transfer
contracts as applied to existing facilities.
(c) Greenfield project: a private entity or a public–private joint
venture builds and operates a new facility. This category
includes build–own–transfer and build–own–operate
contracts as well as merchant power plants.
(d ) Divestiture: a private consortium buys an equity stake in a
state-owned enterprise. The private stake may or may not
imply private management of the company.
Whereas PPPs in energy, telecommunications and transport
sectors in SSA grew at a high level in the early 1990s, PPPs in
water and sanitation have been less common, and the pace of
reform has been slower and harder to sustain politically.12
Governments in SSA were hesitant to ‘privatise’ water services
because of the sensitive political nature of water. Being a basic
necessity, water is seen as a public good, and by some people
as a gift of God, which perceptions challenge the principle of
full-cost recovery for water services.10 Water services have got
some other unique characteristics. Provision of water/sewerage
services is a natural monopoly, for which scale economies of
water production and network systems make it efficient to
have one provider. Second, water/sanitation services have both
positive and negative externalities, whereby benefits and costs
are conferred upon those not party to the transaction; for
example, public health implications and environment
degradation, respectively.5,10 Fig. 1 shows the number and
level of investment (categorised according to the sector) in
SSA for the period 1991 to 2006. It shows that
telecommunications had the largest share of PPPs whereas
water services had the least number of projects and investment
finance.13
For the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph, the
governments of countries in SSA shied away from complete
divesture of water services infrastructure. Whereas there were 31
PPP divesture projects in the energy, telecommunications and
transport sectors in SSA between 1991 and 2006 worth
US$7182million, no divesture project reached closure in the
water/sanitation sector in SSA.13 Table 1 shows the build-up of
PPP projects in the water/sanitation sector in SSA in
comparison with other regions during the period 1991 to 2006.
The table shows that only 22 PPP projects reached financial
closure for provision of water/sanitation services in SSA
between 1991 and 2006. Of these, 19 projects (86%) are/were in
the form of management or lease contracts, two are under
concession contracts, while only one is a greenfield project.13
The table also shows that PPP contracts reached a peak during
the period 1998 to 2001, when they also attracted over
US$100million in investment funding.
Table 1 also shows that SSA accounted for only 4.2% of PPP
projects over the period in all the regions of the world. What is
even more striking is the fact that over the 15-year period, SSA
projects attracted a disproportionate 0.3% of the global
investment funding channelled through PPP water/sanitation
infrastructure projects.13 The latter fact is not surprising,
considering that management and lease contracts, which do not
transfer any investment risks to the private sector entity, are the
most dominant in SSA. Even then, the two multinational
160
120
80
40
0
Energy Telecom Transport Water and
sewerage
N
um
be
r o
f P
PP
 p
ro
jec
ts 
0
5000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
In
ve
st
m
en
t: 
US
$ m
illio
ns
Project count Total investment
Fig. 1. Number of PPP projects and level of investments in sub-
Saharan Africa for period 1991–2006, categorised per sector:
compiled using data from the World Bank13
Financial
closure
year
Number of
projects
Investments in
US$million
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Total Sub-Saharan
Africa
Total
1991 1 2 0 75
1992 1 6 0 284
1993 1 12 0 6629
1994 0 17 0 1362
1995 1 18 0 1835
1996 1 27 20 1312
1997 0 39 0 10 161
1998 1 33 0 2327
1999 5 42 82 6488
2000 1 45 31 8589
2001 4 41 3 2309
2002 2 44 0 1648
2003 1 43 9 1452
2004 0 52 0 4659
2005 1 57 0 1678
2006 2 48 0 2003
Grand total 22 526 146 52 810
Table 1. Water services PPP projects reaching financial closure in
sub-Saharan Africa 1991–2006: compiled using data from the
World Bank13
Management, Procurement and Law 161 Issue MP4 Public–private delivery of urban water services in Africa Kayaga 149
corporations (Saur and Biwater) with concession contracts for
water services in the towns of Dolphin Coast and Nelspruit, both
in South Africa, cut their investment funding by 60 and 100%,
respectively.7 Table 2 gives a summary of PPP contracts in SSA.
The table shows that many PPP contracts in SSA have either
been terminated or distressed. Indeed, SSA accounts for over
80% of all PPP contracts that have been terminated or attracted
disputes between the period 1990 to 2004.7 With the small
investment finance apportioned to SSA (0.3% of global
investment funding for PPPs between 1991 and 2006), these
developments are not surprising given the misplaced
expectations in SSA that PPPs will bring the much-needed
investment financing for infrastructure expansion.7,13,14 The
following section analyses the general performance of water
utilities in SSA that have been managed under PPPs.
4. GENERAL UTILITY PERFORMANCE UNDER PPPS
IN SSA
Apart from attracting investment finance to water services
infrastructure, another key justification for adopting PPPs was
grounded in economic theory that private sector participation
would bring about the much needed efficiency gains.7,10 Studies
carried out in other infrastructure services such as
telecommunications, in which PPPs have induced performance
improvements in developing countries, have shown that
competition is more important than ownership in explaining
efficiency gains.15 However, published studies conducted with
water utilities in SSA have provided mixed results on the
correlation between adoption of PPPs and performance
improvement. Some case studies have shown improvements in
labour productivity, operating costs, reliability and quality of
services, and share of the population served.16 Other positive
changes brought about by PPPs reported in the literature are
(a) strengthening of managerial innovations in the SSA water
sector, such as indexation of tariffs to the rate of inflation
(b) placing water utilities under corporate law and liberating it
from the government rules and regulations
(c) tangible improvements in cost recovery.10
Whereas several studies conducted in SSA have shown evidence
of positive performance trends, most published econometric
analyses of the effects of water privatisation in lower-income
economies show little evidence that PPPs have resulted in
marked improvement in performance.15,17 Another study carried
out in Africa in the late 1990s reported greater service coverage
for utilities under PPPs.18 However, a study of 21 African water
utilities conducted in 1995–1997 found that levels of corruption
and governance were far more important in explaining
difference in efficiency than PPPs.17 Similarly, findings drawn
from analysis of case studies on Guinea, Gabon, Senegal and
Coˆte d’Ivoire carried out at the turn of the century show that, on
the whole, the performance of water utilities under PPPs has not
changed dramatically: utilities have continued to perform well
or not so well, depending on
(a) their state prior to private sector participation
(b) factors operating in the external environment.14
To advance the understanding of performance trends under
PPPs, a comprehensive analysis was recently carried out on data
taken from the Service Providers’ Performance Indicators and
Benchmarking Network Project database of the Water Utilities
Partnerships of Africa. Although the database comprised data
collected in the year 2000 from 110 water utilities in Africa, the
data for this study were collected from up to 84 utilities in 13
countries in SSA, of which 14 utilities were managed under
PPPs.16 The PPPs were management, lease or concession
contracts in the countries of Cameroon, Cape Verde, Coˆte
Country Type(s) of contract
(period: years)
Year of financial
closure
Lead multinational
company
Remarks
Burkina Faso Management (5) 2001 Vivendi
Cape Verde Concession (50) 1999 EdP Distressed
Central African Republic Lease (15) 1991 Saur Terminated
Chad Concession (30) 2000 Veolia Terminated
Coˆte d’Ivoire Lease 1960 Saur Renegotiated for 20 years in 1987
Gabon Concession (20) 1997 Veolia Ongoing
Ghana Management (5) 2007 Vitens Ongoing
Kenya Management (2) 1999 Gauff Ended
Mali Lease (10) 2000 Saur Renationalised
Mozambique—Maputo and Motola Lease (15) 1999 Agua de Portugal Ongoing
Mozambique—three other cities Management (5) 1999 Agua de Portugal Ongoing
Namibia Management 2001 Veolia Ongoing
Niger Lease (10) 2001 Vivendi Ongoing
Rwanda Management (5) 2000 Lahmeya Ended
Senegal Lease (10) 1996 Saur Renewed
S. Africa—Dolphin Coast Concession (30) 1999 Saur Distressed
S. Africa—Nelspruit Concession (30) 1999 Biwater Distressed
S. Africa—Sutterheim Lease (10) 1993 Suez Distressed
S. Africa—Queenstown Lease (25) 1992 Suez Distressed
S. Africa—Johannesburg Management 1999 Suez Ended
Sao Tome and Principe Management Sinergie Distressed
Tanzania Lease 2003 Biwater Terminated
Uganda Management (2) 1998 Gauff Ended
Uganda Management 2002 Suez Ended
Zambia Management (5) 2000 Saur Ended
Table 2. Key PPP contracts in water/sanitation sector in SSA: compiled using data from Hall and Lobina,7 World Bank13 and Bayliss14
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d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Republic of
Guinea, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia. The range
of performance indicators used included labour productivity,
proportion of operating costs spent on fuel and chemicals, rate
of capital utilisation, average tariffs, percentage of population
served, non-revenue water, and hours of availability of service
per day.16 Using F-tests, stochastic frontier and data
envelopment analyses, the study found that, when cross-
country heterogeneity in the political, legal and economic
environment was controlled, there was no strong evidence that
water utilities being managed under PPP contracts performed
better than those exclusively operating under public law.16
A recent study carried out by the World Development
Movement found that one of the key reasons for lack of
performance improvement by PPPs in SSA is that they have not
dedicated adequate funds to improve the service quality.7 Most
of the PPP contracts operating in SSA, notably lease and
management contracts, do not cater for investment by the
private sector in extending services. Furthermore, the
investment commitments agreed under the few concession
contracts operating in SSA have been revised, abandoned or
missed. There are several case studies in the literature that may
illustrate this point. In Libreville, the capital of Gabon, which is
serviced by a PPP consortium led by Veolia, the utility’s
underinvestment was blamed for failure to connect new
households, long interruptions in supply and poor water
quality.7,19 In Mali, a 20-year concession was awarded to Saur
(a French international water operator) in 2000, with the major
objective of making significant expansions in service coverage,
and improving the technical and financial performance. But
Saur was unable to raise the required investment funds to fulfil
its contractual obligations, leading to the Government’s drastic
decision to renationalise the company.7,20,21 The story is not
much different with utilities managed under concession
contracts in South Africa (Dolphin Coast and Nelspruit) where
the PPP contracts were distressed mainly because the private
company was not investing enough funds for improving service
quality.7,14
In general, PPPs have the potential to improve some aspects of
performance. The private sector’s technical and managerial
competences, combined with sustainable pricing policies and
better financial discipline, would enhance the effectiveness and
efficiency of service provision. Furthermore, it was anticipated
that extra investment funds obtained from the private sector
would be injected into improvement of service quality. However,
findings from most studies quoted in the literature, some of
which have been described in the preceding paragraphs, show
that water utilities under PPPs are not necessarily more effective
and efficient than those under public management. One key
factor that compounds the relationship between efficiency gains
and PPPs is the type of competition that is dictated by the unique
characteristics of water services, as discussed in Section 3.
Whereas market competition is feasible in telecommunications
and parts of energy such as power generation, the technology of
water services and the nature of water as a product restrict the
prospect of efficiency gains through market competition. Huge
investment requirements for installing parallel reticulation
networks, and water-quality implications of mixing water from
different supply networks, place a serious restriction on suppliers’
competition for water service customers.15,16
Compared to market competition, tender competition, the most
dominant type of competition in water services provision,
requires a more distinct presence of effective institutions that
play the key roles of referees and judges as a prerequisite for
performance improvement.22 However, PPPs in SSA were often
launched in a regulatory vacuum, as many countries do not
have infrastructure services regulators, courts specialising in
PPP contracts, or similar bodies to act as arbitrators.10 In
countries where the necessary institutions are in place, they
may either be corrupt or inefficient in setting or enforcing
standards. A good and recent example of the latter are events
that led to the cancellation of the 30-year concession contract
for service provision in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in mid-2006:
poor service levels, tariff increases and low investment in
infrastructure expansion were attributed to excessive state
interference, poor regulatory capacity and perceived bias for the
regulated firm.23 It should be borne in mind that regulatory
functions are necessary whether services are being delivered
under PPPs or public management. It seems that the quality of
regulation, rather than level of private sector participation, is a
critical success factor for determining the extent to which
pressures for efficiency are maintained on the service provider.3
The next section presents a case study from Uganda, which
shows that performance of the National Water and Sewerage
Corporation (NWSC) in Kampala (the capital city) did not
improve as anticipated when it was managed under PPP. On the
other hand, NWSC has made huge gains in efficiency during the
past few years under public management.
5. THE KAMPALA (UGANDA) PPP CASE STUDY
Unless otherwise stated, the material used in this section has
exclusively been drawn from a forthcoming World Bank
Working Paper on the transformation of NWSC.24 Water and
sewerage services in Kampala (2002 population of 1 208 504),
the capital city of Uganda, are provided by NWSC, a
government-owned corporatised firm, which was established by
the then military government’s Decree No. 34 of 1972. NWSC’s
legal position was strengthened by the NWSC Statute No. 7 of
1995, later by the NWSC Act of 2000, and was mandated to
provide water and sewerage services to the country’s major
towns, currently numbering 22, on a cost-recovery basis. The
other key player in Uganda’s water sector is the Directorate of
Water Development, which is mandated to provide water
services to rural areas and small towns (with less than 20 000
people). Since 1998, the water sector has been undergoing
reform, aimed at clearly separating the functions of operations,
asset holding/management and regulating/overseeing. To date
this reform process has not yet been finalised. However, owing
to the historical loans obtained by NWSC for infrastructure
expansion, which were guaranteed by the government, NWSC
has since the late 1990s been put under the oversight of the
Utility Reform Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning.
When NWSC operated in only the three largest towns of the
country (i.e. Kampala, Jinja and Entebbe), its performance could
easily be classified as being fairly average. As the Government
of Uganda rehabilitated and expanded infrastructure in the
smaller towns and obliged NWSC to take them over, the capital
costs passed on to NWSC, coupled with the eroded economies of
scale, created a financial burden to the utility. Furthermore, the
high disparity in income levels between households in primary
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and secondary towns meant that customers in the new service
areas generally had a lower ability and willingness to pay for
increased service levels. By 1997, NWSC’s financial forecasts
were quite bleak: not only was it experiencing operating deficits
but it was shortly expected to start servicing the investment
loans, to the tune of over US$100million. These developments
were taking place in NWSC’s internal environment at the time
when adoption of PPPs in developing countries which were
marketed by international financial institutions as the saviour
of poor utility performance, was at a peak. NWSC’s
management and other policy makers in the Ugandan water
sector therefore perceived a management contract with an
international water operator as an opportunity to correct the
prevailing weaknesses and deter potentially devastating threats.
Characteristic of many first-generation PPPs in developing
countries, NWSC hastily negotiated the management contract
with H P Gauff, a German technical consulting firm, without
going through a full tendering process, with confidence based
on the fact that H P Gauff was participating in a similar
contract in Malindi, in neighbouring Kenya. What they did not
take into consideration was the fact that these management
contracts were running at about the same time, H P Gauff was
venturing into utility management for the very first time, and it
was unlikely for the contractor to transfer effectively knowledge
and skills obtained from Malindi, a comparatively smaller city,
to Kampala, a larger city. The hasty procurement process had
several key implications. First, since it was single-sourcing, the
process missed out on competencies inherent in the competition
for the market. Second, the skills and the available time were
inadequate for collecting the necessary baseline data for
effective contract negotiation and subsequent monitoring and
evaluation. Third, many stakeholders were not given enough
time to internalise the process and buy into the whole PPP
concept. Fourth, the hasty nature also became a breeding
ground for accusation of rent-seeking during the procurement
process. Finally, inadequate time was available to set up and
train a team to monitor and evaluate the project.
The three-year management contract, called the Kampala
revenue improvement project, started in 1998. Its major
objectives were to improve revenue collection, reduce water loss
in the reticulation network, and increase service coverage.
Therefore the scope of the management contract was limited to
operations of water distribution and sales, but excluded water
production and sewerage services. The client retained
responsibilities for financing the operational costs (inclusive of
staff costs), and contract monitoring was governed on the basis
of cost of service. This approach to contract management did
not provide enough incentives for the operator to contain costs.
Furthermore, the fact that the client retained most functions of
personnel management meant that the operator could not
control the staff. The ill-defined performance targets and the
poor structure monitoring system meant that there was not
enough pressure to bear on the contractor to improve
operational efficiency. Performance targets were evaluated on a
yearly basis, and Table 3 shows the trends for the revenue
collection function, with modest improvements as per set
targets. Similarly, service coverage was reported to have
improved from 51 to 57% between 1998 and 2001. However,
most of the data were difficult to verify, especially so as the
baseline data were not accurately obtained.
When the Kampala revenue improvement project contract
ended, NWSC senior managers and other key policy makers in
the water sector evaluated the whole experience as part of
adaptive learning. These lessons were applied to undertake
modifications in the design, procurement and implementation of
the subsequent two-year management contract with Ondeo
International (formerly Lyonnaise des Eaux) that ran from 2002
to 2004. The contractor registered a local company, Ondeo
Services Uganda Ltd (OSUL). The following key changes were
made to ensure higher levels of performance from the OSUL
management contract.
(a) The procurement process took about 18 months, and used
international competitive bidding.
(b) More NWSC managers were involved in the procurement
process, hence securing better buy-in and understanding.
(c) The contractor took full charge of both the water distribution
and wastewater collection, leaving out water production and
sewage disposal.
(d ) The contractor took full control of the staff seconded to the
project.
(e) The contract incorporated an operational investment fund,
dedicated for network rehabilitation, which was mainly
funded by Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau (KFW), a German
international development agency.
( f ) The contract incorporated a performance incentive fee based
on billings, collections, non-revenue water and service access.
(g) There were quarterly reviews, with the contractor required to
provide process-oriented reports.
Table 4 shows performance trends during the Kampala OSUL
management contract. On the whole the performance was better
than during the previous contract. The table shows that the
revenue collection targets were met, although billings were
1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001
Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual
Billing efficiency: % 45 49 52 56 65 53
Billings:
Ushsmillion
22 372 16 911 25 016 16 233 32 410 20 426
Collections:
Ushsmillion
17 898 18 348 20 763 15 705 27 549 24 306
Collection ratio: % 80 109 83 97 85 119
Table 3. Performance trends during the Kampala revenue improvement project management contract: compiled using data from
Mugisha et al.24 (Ushs, Ugandan shillings)
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much boosted by the tariff adjustments of 4 and 5% in 2003
and 2004, respectively. The rate of increase of new connections
improved from a monthly average of 473 in the first year to 681
in the second year. However, despite the injection of substantial
funds in the reticulation network, the key performance indicator
for reduction of non-revenue water was not achieved. Another
target that fell short was connection efficiency, defined as the
proportion of active to total connections, which shows how
many customers were disconnected mainly due to non-payment
of water bills. There was a general feeling within NWSC that
OSUL would have performed better if they had not spent about
half of the contract time and the bulk of the operational
investment fund on merely carrying out baseline studies.
The implementation of OSUL enabled NWSC staff to consolidate
their knowledge and skills in PPP procurement, contract design
and implementation. The real experience was supplemented by
short courses attended by key staff on relevant topics such as
contract procurement and management, negotiation skills, etc.
These skills became handy when the contractor demanded a
renegotiation seeking a 20% increase in the management fee in
the first year of the contract, and during negotiations for
extension of the contract. The latter negotiations were carried
out based on a detailed cost-of-service analysis of all
production processes carried out by NWSC. After consultations
with their head office, OSUL opted against extension of the
contract, and finally handed over the management of the
service area back to NWSC in February 2004.
After five years of PPPs, Kampala water supply area was
‘received back in the main fold’ of NWSC’s directly-managed
towns, which at the time were benefiting from a series of
short-term change management programmes to improve
performance. These programmes were started in 1998, by a
newly appointed managing director, who found an internal
environment dominated by low revenue collections, increasing
deficits of working capital, stagnant numbers of customers, a
high non-revenue water proportion and a demoralised staff. In
the external environment, there were a high number of illegal
connections, negative public relations and an impeding
obligation to start servicing a huge loan. The new managing
director rallied the staff towards short-term change
management programmes with the overall objective of
increasing operational and financial efficiency. The main focus
areas were improving water production and sewage treatment
capacity, increasing efficiency in water distribution,
particularly with respect to non-revenue water, improving
revenue collection, cost reduction, and enhancement of
customer care.
The change programmes were codenamed, in a chronological
order, 100-days programme, the service and revenue
enhancement programme, area performance contracts and
internally delegated management contracts. Area performance
contracts were six-monthly internal contracts that NWSC senior
management initiated in which many operational tasks were
delegated by the centralised service areas, and where incentives/
disincentives were closely pegged to prescribed performance
levels. With time, area performance contracts evolved into
longer-term internally delegated management contracts, in
which the areas became more autonomous in the functional
tasks.
On the external front, NWSC negotiated a three-year
performance contract with the Government of Uganda in 2000,
which brought into operation the conditions set for the debt
freeze. This contract was renewed for the second and third
terms. NWSC’s contract with the government formed the
framework for the NWSC head office to design area
performance contracts and internally delegated management
contracts with the decentralised service areas. NWSC head office
was duly declared as an asset-holding authority in 2004. The
changes in the external and internal environment of NWSC
have mirrored the concepts from the new public management
paradigm with the following characteristics that are specific to
water services.25
(a) Increasing the level of autonomy of the utility.
(b) Separating regulatory tasks from service provision.
(c) Creating quasi-competition in the water sector.
(d ) Increasing tariffs to cost-recovering levels and ensuring that
staff aim to increase customer satisfaction.
(e) Increasing accountability for the results produced by the
utility.
The results of these change management programmes have been
amazing. The operational performance of NWSC has improved
tremendously and NWSC has recently been lauded as a utility of
good practices in the region, and has been working with other
Performance standard Base year
2001
Year 1: 2002–2003 Year 2: 2003–2004
Target Actual Target Actual
Water billed:  106m3 1562 1765 1655 1952.5 1736.7
Non-revenue water: % 44.5 39.8 44.4 35.7 45.5
Average monthly billings: Ushsmillion 1611.4 1820.9 1818.5 2014.3 2006.3
Average monthly collections: Ushsmillion 1567.8 1900.6 1805.6 2123.1 1914.1
Active water connections 33 050 39 070 38 659 46 840 45 722
Inactive water connections 10 783 8760 11 637 6920 12 445
Total water connections 43 833 47 830 50 296 53 760 58 167
Connection efficiency: % 75.4 81.7 76.9 87.1 78.6
Metering efficiency—actual: % 90.5 90.9 92.6 93.0 94.6
Average monthly new connections 473 525 506 580 681
Table 4. Performance trends during the Kampala OSUL management contract: compiled using data from Mugisha et al.24 (Ushs, Ugandan
shillings)
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utilities in the region to apply these approaches for their own
benefit. Table 5 shows performance trends for NWSC since 1998
when the innovative management approaches started. It should
be noted that this performance is aggregated for all the service
areas under NWSC, and Kampala accounts for over 60% of the
business turnover. The table shows that performance between
2003 and 2006, when NWSC was in charge of Kampala, was
increasing at a higher rate than previously when Kampala, the
main service area, was managed under PPPs.
The Kampala case study results confirm the theory suggested in
various publications that PPPs have a smaller effect on
performance improvement of a water utility, compared to other
context-specific factors. Other factors that may have a stronger
effect include26
(a) an adequate degree of external autonomy
(b) full political support to strike a delicate balance between
political and financial objectives of the organisation
(c) effective regulatory structures that ensure internal and
external accountability
(d ) customer orientation philosophy of utility staff.
A critical success factor is the high skills level of the human
resources, an area that NWSC has been investing in heavily
since the early 1990s. Another key success factor is a dedicated,
visionary and foresighted leadership to coordinate and
harmonise the human and other organisational resources in
order to better leverage the utility’s strengths, correct its
weaknesses, capitalise on opportunities and deter potentially
devastating threats.
6. CONCLUSION
Key justifications of international financial agencies to compel
water utilities in SSA to take on PPPs were the need to attract
the much needed capital financing for water services
infrastructure, and the prospect of performance improvement
under PPPs. This paper has reviewed the literature on
performance of water utilities in SSA, which shows that neither
of these has been automatic for many utilities operating under
PPPs in SSA. The type of PPPs commonly operating in SSA are
management and lease contracts, which do not entail
investment funding on the part of the operator. The literature
presents mixed results, with no strong evidence showing the
link between PPPs and performance improvement. A case study
on Kampala, Uganda, has shown that performance
improvements of NWSC, the utility in Kampala, were not as
high as expected when it was twice managed by different
international operators. On the other hand, NWSC has made
impressive performance improvements under the current public
management model. Although not conclusive, the results from
the literature and the case study seem to point to a greater
importance of context-specific factors. There is a need for
further research into the effects of an appropriate level of
external autonomy, commercial orientation, existence of
regulatory systems to ensure internal and external
accountability, customer orientation, human resource
development and a visionary leadership.
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